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COMMENT
DISQUALIFYING FEDERAL DISTRICT
JUDGES WITHOUT CAUSE
Although we deny the petition for recusal, we add a caveat. The
record adversely reflects upon [Federal District] Judge Lord's con-
duct during the pretrial proceedings. Reluctantly, we have pointed out
his shortcomings in this case.... We commend to Judge Lord the So-
cratic definition of the four qualities required of every judge: to hear
courteously; to answer wisely; to consider soberly; and to decide im-
partially.'
Attorneys who appear in federal district court are virtually power-
less to remove a judge from a particular case when they personally
believe, rightly or wrongly, that justice will not be done by that indi-
vidual judge. The present disqualification statute requires a showing
of sufficient "cause" to remove a judge. By judicial interpretation, the
adequacy of the cause alleged, which is difficult to establish in its own
right, is passed upon by the very judge being challenged. The federal
appellate courts are very reluctant to reverse a district judge who has
refused to disqualify himself.
Yet the sometimes inarticulable doubts held by attorneys about an
individual judge are real concerns. The inability of an attorney to
remove a federal district judge from a particular case except by use of
the current extremely awkward and highly unsuccessful disqualifi-
cation procedure is a source of frustration which undermines the con-
fidence of both the bar and the public in the federal district courts.
Senator Birch Bayh has observed: "No statute creates more distrust
than does the section 144 procedure for disqualification for preju-
dice."3
Senator Bayh introduced legislation in both the 91st and 92d Con-
gresses to amend Section 144 to permit attorneys to remove a federal
1. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 544 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970). This section is quoted in the text accompanying note
76 infra.
3. 117 CONG. REC. 15268 (1971).
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district judge from an individual case by filing an affidavit of preju-
dice, which need not explain why the judge should be removed from
the case. So long as the affidavit is timely filed, the challenged judge
would have no discretion; he must disqualify himself from the case
immediately. Seventeen states currently employ such "'without cause"
disqualification procedures.4
This Comment will examine the desirability of adopting a without
cause disqualification procedure to allow either party to remove a fed-
eral district judge from a particular case. After a discussion of the
need for disqualification mechanisms, existing procedures for re-
moval, either from a particular case or from the bench entirely, are
discussed. Proposals for change, especially the Bayh bills, are outlined
and evaluated in light of the practical problems peculiar to the federal
district courts. The Comment concludes that a procedure to disqualify
federal district judges without cause, as contained in the Bayh bills, is
sound and should be adopted. Such a procedure would provide a
middle ground between the existing extremes of the practicing attor-
ney's almost total inability to remove a judge from a case and the
spectre of removal from the bench entirely; the system should provide
a healthy check on federal district judges without undue strain or
humiliation for either the lawyers or judges involved.5
I. THE NEED FOR DISQUALIFICATION MECHANISMS
A. The Role of the Federal District Judge
We must remember, too, that we have to make judges out of men, and
that by being made judges their prejudices are not diminished and
their intelligence is not increased.
-Robert G. Ingersol
6
Although the description is not often found in legal literature, fed-
4. See Project, Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias-Common Law
Evolution, Current Status, and the Oregon Experience, 48 ORE. L. REV. 311. 347
(1969) (tabulation of disqualification mechanisms in the 50 states) [hereinafter cited
as Oregon Project]. A without cause affidavit procedure permits disqualification
without a hearing on the truth or legal sufficiency of the facts alleged.
5. Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 43, 67 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Frank].
6. L. GOLDBERG & E. LEVENSON, LAWLESS JUDGES 245 n.l1 (1935) [hereinafter
cited as LAWLESS JUDGES].
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eral district judges can be characterized as the tyrants of America's
judiciary. Whether benevolent or despotic, they occupy a position of
singular independence and isolation when compared to their fellow
judges in either the federal or state judiciaries. They receive a life
appointment (subject only to a good behavior proviso)7 at high pay
(presently $40,000 a year).8 Primarily trial judges, because of their
independence and isolation, they can operate their courtrooms as
small kingdoms, subject only to the direct personal influence of the
chief federal district judge and to indirect institutional influences such
as the Federal Rules of Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
appellate review.
Unlike federal appellate judges, district judges are not often partici-
pants in the interchange of ideas characteristic of the courts of appeal
or the Supreme Court. : Unlike state trial judges, they are not subject
to reelection and the direct pressure of the local bar.10 There is prob-
ably less "rotation" of federal trial judges than of state trial judges.
This combination of independence and isolation can produce supe-
rior judges and allow them to operate in an atmosphere of compara-
tive judicial freedom. Many lawyers and judges are leading reform
movements to assure more independence for state trial judges for pre-
cisely this reason."1 But the combination of independence and isola-
tion can produce less than superior judges as well. In the words of
Justice Holmes, "Judges commonly are elderly men and more likely to
hate at sight any analysis to which they are not accustomed, and
which disturbs repose of mind, than to fall in love with novelties.' 12
Comparative independence and extended isolation can make a diffi-
cult situation unbearable; a courtroom operated like a small kingdom
can prove intolerable to lawyers.
Although there is no accepted definition of what is a good or a bad
judge, few would deny that there are inadequate judges on the federal
bench at the district court level. Certainly judges whose general per-
7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 135 (1970).
9. R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS 103 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as RICHARDSON & VINES].
10. What pressure the local bar exerts appears almost exclusively during the selec-
tion process, discussed in the text accompanying notes 13-32 infra.
11. See, e.g., Utter, Selection and Retention--A Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH.
L. REV. 839 (1973).
12. LAWLESS JUDGES, supra note 6, at v.
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formance is satisfactory may still have difficulty with specific cases.
Efforts to improve the quality of federal district court judges
usually focus on the selection process, which has received extensive
study in recent years.' 3 The American Bar Association (ABA) Com-
mittee on the Federal Judiciary rated a rather substantial percentage
(5 percent) of eventual appointees to federal district judgeships as
"Not qualified".' 4 Approximately 60 percent of the appointees re-
ceived either "Exceptionally well qualified" or "Well qualified"
recommendations. 5
Would elimination of the nominees who are confirmed despite a
"Not qualified" recommendation be helpful? Would increasing the
percentage of nominees with prior judicial experience improve the
overall quality of federal district judges?
No one knows.'16 It must be remembered that the ABA opposed the
nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to the Supreme Court in a statement
signed by ex-President Taft and six former presidents of the ABA.
[ T] he statement emphasized that Brandeis's *reputation, character,
and professional career' made him 'not a fit person to be a member of
the Supreme Court'...."17 One of President Kennedy's appointees to
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
Judge Cox, has been the subject of stinging rebukes for his dilatory
13. See J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS ANDJUDGES ( 1965) [hereinafter cited asGROSSIAN]:
H. CHASE. FEDERAL JUDGES: TIE SELECTION PROCESS (1972) [hereinafter cited as
FEDERAL JUDGES].
14. Of the Eisenhower appointees, 5.7% were rated "Not qualified." GROSSMAN
at 198. Of the Kennedy appointees, 6.3% received a similar rating. FEDERAL JUDGES
at 178. (GROSSMAN at 198 places the Kennedy figure at 7.3% as "not qualified or op-
posed".) Of the Johnson appointees, 2.8% were rated "Not qualified." FEDERAL JUDGES
at 178.
15. Of the Eisenhower appointees, 61.7c/ received one of these two ratings. GROSS-
MAN at 198. Of the Kennedy appointees, 62.2% received one of the two ratings. FED-
ERAL JUDGES at 178. (GROSSMAN at 198 places the Kennedy figure at 61.8%.) For
Johnson appointees, the figure is 55.5%. FEDERAL JUDGES at 178.
16. After a lengthy study, Harold Chase observed:
Suffice it to say here that in my studied opinion, there is no grave emergency
situation with respect to the selection of federal judges. . . . Interestingly
enough. interviews and observation have led me to the conclusion that. where a
judge is regarded as unfit for the federal bench, it is not the fault of the selection
process. but rather of the constitutional provision granting that federal judges
"shall hold their offices during good behavior."
FFDERAL JUDGES. supra note 13, at 189. Chase also concluded that "any attempt
to make mandatory a requirement of judicial experience [for a federal judgeship]
would be unwise." Id. at 199.
17. GROSSMAN. supra note 13, at 55. quoting A. T. MASON. BRANDEIS: A FREE
MAN'S LIFE 489 (1946). See generally Frank. The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis,
17 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1965).
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tactics and failure to abide by the obvious mandate of the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in the civil rights cases which appeared before
him.' 8 Yet Judge Cox received an "Exceptionally well qualified"
rating from the ABA '9 less than two years before his judicial perform-
ance in civil rights cases was subjected to severe criticism by the Fifth
Circuit,20 legal periodicals, 21 and the national press.22 The Brandeis and
Cox examples illustrate that the ABA's judgment is far from infallible-
or even, perhaps, democratic. 23
Increasing the percentage of nominees with prior judicial experi-
ence would not necessarily improve the quality of federal district
judges. Although 7 out of 10 nominees had no prior judicial experi-
ence in 1963,24 the lawyer members of the ABA Committee on the
Federal Judiciary indicated that they preferred a nominee with a suc-
cessful trial practice over a nominee with prior judicial experience in a
state court.2 5 Moreover, prior judicial experience cannot be equated
to a "good record" as a judge. Shifting a bad judge from a state to a
federal bench solves nothing and may serve to compound and perpet-
uate the original mistake. In any event, evaluation of prior judicial
experience is very difficult.2 6
An inquiry into possible methods of improving the qualifications of
federal district court nominees is probably a fruitless exercise. Al-
18. Comment, Judicial Performance in the Fifth Circuit, 73 YALE LJ. 90, 107
n.87 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Performance].
19. Id. at 107 n.88.
20. Id. at 101-02 n.71. See Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 893 (1962). In Brown v. State, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 780
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 26, 1961), the "freedom riders" case, Judge Cox refused to remove
the case from state to federal court, stating: "This Court may not be regarded as any
haven for any such counterfeit citizens from other states deliberately seeking to cause
trouble here among its people."
21. Judicial Performance at 101 n.71 & 107 n.87.
22. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 4, 1963, at 25, col. 2; id., July 19, 1963, at 8,
col. 3.
23. As stated by Professor Morris R. Cohen:
Our system selects judges from those who have been leaders at the Bar. Such
leadership generally falls to those who have been able to secure the rich clients.
It is natural for those who have associated with the wealthy and have defended
the interests of property for a long time to continue to look at things from that
point of view after they mount the bench.
LAWLESS JUDGES, supra note 6, at v.
24. RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 9, at 75.
25. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 112.
26. "But although there is some agreement on who the great judges are, lower
judicial performance cannot be easily and reliably evaluated." RICHARDSON & VINES,
supra note 9, at 76.
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though the ABA Committee on the Federal Judiciary has taken a
much more activist role in the nomination and confirmation process
for federal district judges, the practice of senatorial courtesy con-
tinues. Thus, the Senators of the President's party of the state where
the judgeship is located have powerful influence with the Senate J udi-
ciary Committee, including a veto power over the President's nom-
inees.27 One commentator has observed: 28
[The Senate] has appropriated the President's power of nomination
so far as it concerns appointments of interest to senators of the party
in power; and the President has virtually surrendered his power di-
rectly to local party politics as to appointments in states where sena-
tors are of the opposition.
In the two instances where the ABA waged a fight in the Senate J udi-
ciary Committee, the appointment of Sarah T. Hughes to a federal
district court in Texas and the appointment of Irving Ben Cooper to
the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York, it
lost. -  One Senator observed in the Sarah T. Hughes confirmation pro-
ceedings: :u 0
[I] t might be well if [the ABA Committee] would read the law occa-
sionally and confine themselves perhaps to the purpose for which they
were created instead of attempting to influence appointments of this
kind ... as they have attempted to do in many cases over the country.
In summary, few conclusions can be drawn about what background
or particular qualifications should be sought in nominees, or who
should have more or less influence in the selection process.:" The only
27. RICHARDSON & VINES at 58-63.
28. Id. at 60, quoting E. HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 23 (1944).
29. GROSSMAN, supra note 13, recounts both episodes in detail at 179-194.
30. Id. at 179-80, quoting (then) Senator Long of Missouri.
31. Compare the conclusion of Judicial Performance, supra note 18. about the
solution to the problems in the federal district courts of the Fifth Circuit in the early
1960's:
The chief difficulty arises not from the behavior of judges but from the appoint-
ment of men who in important areas will not observe the self-discipline upon
which an appellate system is premised. The principal cure must be found in the
appointment of judges who will disinterestedly comply with decisions of higher
courts.
Id. at 133. The Comment made no suggestions about how judges who would "dis-
interestedly comply with decisions of higher courts" could be selected. Earlier the
Comment had noted that of the eight appointments of President Kennedy to federal
district courts in the Fifth Circuit, "four have indicated a considerable reluctance to
114
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safe conclusion which can be reached is that no matter what qualifica-
tions are sought, no matter which group or groups select and screen
the nominees, inadequate federal district judges will inevitably appear
on the bench. As stated by (then) Deputy Attorney General Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach in response to ABA criticism of President Kennedy's
appointment of federal district judges who were rated "Not qualified"
(7.3 percent)::32
I would be very surprised if there were not judges appointed who will
prove to have been unworthy and unqualified .... I think that at least
some of the Judges found by this Committee to be unqualified will...
prove to have been good appointments. I think some of the Judges
found to be qualified will, over a period of years, prove to have been
bad appointments.
A "bad appointment" is not necessarily to be defined as a judge
who performs inadequately in every case. More likely, a judge is con-
sidered bad if his or her performance falls below acceptable standards
in a significant number of cases. A judge who is competent to handle
simple tort actions may not be capable of controlling a complex
anti-trust dispute; a judge whose partiality in criminal cases is ques-
tionable may be adjudged impartial in all civil actions. As other com-
mentators have noted, it is doubtful that any selection process, no
matter how thorough, can consistently provide judges with no weak-
nesses.
Finally, all trial judges occasionally are faced with ticklish situa-
tions involving the appearance of prejudice or a potential conflict of
interest. As stated by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals: 33
We recognize that advocates construe statements of a trial judge in
a somewhat partisan light and thus magnify the impact of any com-
ment of the court, whether it be favorable or critical. A trial judge,
unless he carefully weighs his pretrial comments, may very well leave
the impression that he has improperly prejudged a case, a situation
follow the letter and spirit of the prevailing law in the civil rights area." Id. at 106
& n.84. As noted earlier, one of those four, Judge Cox, had received an "exceptionally
well qualified" rating from the ABA. Id. at 107.
32. Oral Reply of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to House of Delegates, Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association, San Francisco, 1962, quoted in GROSSMAN
at 79.
33. Pfizer Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 532, 544 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976
(1972).
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which seems to have occurred here. It is important that the litigant not
only actually receive justice, but that he believe he has received jus-
tice. A judge, like Caesar's wife, should be above suspicion.
To avoid giving the impression that a case has been improperly pre-
judged is a difficult task for a trial judge; avoiding such an impression
in all cases may be an impossible task even for the best of judges. The
impossibility of the task points up the need for disqualification mecha-
nisms in individual cases.
B. Conflicts of Interest
1. Financial
Historically, pecuniary interest in the outcome of litigation has been
a ground for disqualification of either trial or appellate judges. In-
deed, financial conflict of interest was, for a time, the only ground for
disqualification.34 Nonetheless, the definition of what constitutes a
pecuniary or financial interest in a proceeding is a fuzzy one.
In 1927, the Supreme Court in Tumey v. Ohio: 5 held that a judge
could not hear a case in which he received a portion of the fine im-
posed upon the defendant. In re Murchison,t 6 decided in 1955, held
that due process requires that 'no man can be a judge in his own case
and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the
outcome. 3 7 In 1972, Tumey and Murchison were followed in Ward
v. Village of Monroeville.3 8 All three cases involved instances where
the judge had a direct financial interest in the outcome of the pro-
ceeding. Receipt of a portion of the fine collected is certainly a proxi-
mate connection, but is there such a connection when the judge owns
an infinitesimally small percentage of a corporation? Just what finan-
cial ligature makes a judge no longer above suspicion?
The furor following the nomination of Circuit Judge Clement J.
Haynsworth, Jr., to the United States Supreme Court over alleged
34. Frank. supra note 5. at 43. citing the maxim "'no man shall be a judge in his
own case," which originated in Dr. Bonham's Case. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1608).
35. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
36. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
37. Id. at 136.
38. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). Both Tuney and Ward are briefly discussed in Clark.
The Needfor Judicial Reformn, 48 WASH. L. REV. 806, 808 (1973).
116
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financial conflicts of interest has helped to clarify what connection is
necessary and illustrates the expansion of what constitutes a pecuniary
or financial interest in a proceeding. Sitting as an appellate judge in
several cases involving as a party litigant a corporation in which he
held a small number of shares, Judge Haynsworth did not disclose to
counsel the extent and nature of his holdings nor did he disqualify
himself.: 5) Many observers believe that it was Judge Haynsworth's re-
fusal to disqualify himself which led the Senate to reject his nomina-
tion.40
The Haynsworth experience changed the accepted disqualification
standard from a "substantial interest" to "any interest" in order to
avoid even the appearance of impropriety. " During his confirmation
hearings, Justice Blackmun testified that the times had changed, and
that "after the Haynsworth episode, he had disqualified himself in pre-
cisely the kind of small interest case in which he previously would
have sat." 2 Whether the change of standard from one of "substantial
interest" to one of "any interest" is a change of form rather than sub-
39. In the NLRB v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. cases, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir.
1963) & 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968), Judge Haynsworth was a "substantial stock-
holder" in a vending company which had machines in plants of several affiliates of
defendant's parent corporation. Judge Haynsworth neither disclosed his holdings
nor disqualified himself. When questions arose in 1963 regarding the propriety of his
conduct, the Judge was cleared of all charges after an investigation by the circuit
judges and the Department of Justice. (Judge Haynsworth requested the investiga-
tion.) In Brunswick Corp. v. Long, 392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
966 (1968), Judge Haynsworth bought $16,000 worth of Brunswick stock after an
appellate panel of which he was a member had decided in favor of the Brunswick
Corporation. Although he did not realize that the formal opinion had not been
released when he purchased the stock, Judge Haynsworth failed to disqualify himself
when the opinion was presented for his signature. In Farrow v. Grace Lines, Inc.,
381 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1967), Donohue v. Maryland Casualty Co., 363 F.2d 442
(4th Cir. 1966), and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Baldwin, 357 F.2d 338 (4th Cir.
1966), Judge Haynsworth held an extremely small amount of the outstanding stock
in one of the party litigants. Again he neither disclosed his interest nor disqualified
himself.
40. The coalition which defeated Judge Haynsworth's nomination was composed
both of Senators who opposed the nominee's political and social viewpoint, especially
with regard to racial questions, and of those who were troubled by the conflict of
interest questions. John P. Frank believes that the swing votes came from the latter
group. Frank, supra note 5, at 43.
41. Compare ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 4, with ABA CODE OF JUDI-
CIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2 (Final Draft 1972) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT].
42. Frank, supra note 5, at 61-62, citing Hearings on the Nomination of Harry
A. Blackmun to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 9 Ist Cong., 2d Sess. 49-50 (1970).
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stance is debatable, but it appears that the "appearance of impropriety
standard" is now accepted. '
2. Personal
By the end of the nineteenth century, personal conflicts of interest
had been added as a ground for disqualifying judges. 14 Bias or preju-
dice may be inferred when a party litigant or counsel is a blood rela-
tive, former law partner, client or friend (past or present) of the judge.
or when the government agency in which the judge or justice was
formerly employed is a party litigant.
A personal conflict of interest is as difficult to identify as an "indi-
rect" financial conflict of interest. Accordingly, it has been suggested
frequently of late that the "appearance of impropriety" standard
should apply to this area as well.' 5 Yet even this proposed solution
offers no easy answer to the potential conflicts presented. Applied in a
financial context, the "appearance of impropriety" standard works
well-the judge or justice either has a financial interest, direct or indi-
rect, or he or she does not. One simple way for judges to avoid most
financial conflict of interest problems is not to own corporate stock.
But few judges can do without friends or relatives and most have
43. According to Professor David Mellinkoff, that is how it should be. Regarding
the Haynsworth cases, Professor Mellinkoff observed:
As a member of the bar for 30 years I accept Judge Haynsworth's explanation.
At the same time I cannot but observe that to the unsuccessful litigant in
Justice Haynsworth's Court the explanation would ring hollow. At best losing a
lawsuit is a disheartening, at worst a crushing experience to anyone convinced
rightly or wrongly of the justice of his cause. The disappointment is endurable
only under a system of justice in which the loser knows that the process by which
he lost was a fair one.
• It is not difficult to imagine the bitterness in the heart of the injured seaman
when he learns that one of the judges to whom he appealed in vain to right the
supposed wrong of the Grace Lines was even a small owner of the company that
owns Grace Lines. By the standard of the marketplace Justice Haynsworth's stock-
holding was trifling. It looms large in the mind of the unhappy litigant search-
ing to discover just what it was that tipped the scale ofjustice against him.
To avoid such avoidable strains on the legal system. it has long been a maxim
of the law that courts shall not only do justice but that they shall seem to do
justice....
Letter from Professor David Mellinkoff to Senator James 0. Eastland. Chairman.
Senate Judiciary Committee. October 20. 1969. quoted in 116 CONG. RE(. 27798
(1970).
44. Frank, supra note 5, at 44.
45. See generally Note. Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal
Courts, 86 HARV. L. REV. 736 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification of Judges].
discussing Canon 3C of the CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. supra note 41.
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former law partners, clients or agency contacts. Under either the "ap-
pearance of impropriety" standard or the new Code of Judicial Con-
duct Canon 3C's standard which requires a judge to disqualify him-
self whenever "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned,"' 46
where is the line drawn?
Personal conflicts of interest are significant because they lead to
bias or the inference of bias. If a judge is a friend or relative of a
party litigant, the inference of favoritism is easily aroused. The judge
may in fact have been impartial, but it may be difficult to convince a
losing litigant of that impartiality.' 7
A century ago, two Supreme Court Justices failed to disqualify
themselves when participating in cases argued by their brothers.48
Today, such behavior would be unacceptable by anyone's standards.
Professor John P. Frank states that the American practice is for a
judge to disqualify himself "at various points between the third and
sixth degrees" of relationship by blood.4 ) However, Judge Learned
Hand reviewed on appeal decisions by his cousin, Judge Augustus N.
Hand, when the former was a circuit judge and the latter a district
judge.50 Further, it has not been the practice of Supreme Court Jus-
tices to disqualify themselves in cases argued by former law part-
ners.5 1 Whether a Justice disqualifies himself when presented with
a case coming out of an agency (usually the Department of Justice) in
which he was formerly employed depends upon the nature of the case
and the disposition of the Justice.52 Justice Rehnquist felt compelled
to explain in a special memorandum 53 his refusal to disqualify himself
in Laird v. Tatum,5 4 a case in which he had expressed his views while
46. See note 41 supra.
47. See the quotation from Professor Mellinkoff in note 43 supra.
48. Frank, supra note 5, at 47.
49. Id. at 46 & n.19. S. 1064, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § I (b)(5) (1973) draws
the line at the third degree. S. 1064 is discussed in Part II, Section C, infra.
50. Frank, supra note 5, at 48 n.25, citing New York & Albany Lighterage Co.
v. Bowers, 4 F.2d 604 (S.D. N.Y. 1925), affd, 10 F.2d 1017 (2nd Cir. 1926).
51. Frank, supra note 5, at 49, discusses the 1946 incident when Justice Jackson
sharply criticized Justice Black for failing to disqualify himself from a case argued
by his former law partner and notes that Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone did
not disqualify themselves in similar situations. See generally Frank, Disqualification
of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947).
52. Frank, supra note 5, at 49-50.
53. 409 U.S. 824 (1972). The Memorandum is discussed and criticized in Note,
Justice Rehnquist's Decision to Participate in Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV.
106(1973).
119
Washington Law Review
an Assistant Attorney General. Finally, although -[e]ach Justice
will inevitably have friends at the bar, and some of them are very
close,"-55 this circumstance alone is not a ground for disqualification in
the Supreme Court.1 Even former Justices have argued cases before
the Court.5
7
C. Favoritism or Antagonism-Prejudice
Closely related to the topic of personal conflicts of interest is the
concept of prejudice stemming from prior exposure to the counsel at
bar, the party litigant or the issue being litigated, or simply from the
judge's cultural background. These areas are not often the subject of
attention, yet if we are concerned with preserving or creating "a
system of justice in which the loser knows that the process by which
he lost was a fair one,"-:58 the appearance of favoritism or antagonism
must be considered.
In this context, prior exposure to counsel should be defined solely
in terms of prior exposure at trial or during some stage of the litiga-
tion. It would be belaboring the obvious to detail the many instances in
which a lawyer may feel that a judge is displaying favoritism towards
the other counsel or antagonism towards himself.-,' In federal district
courts, lawyers are powerless to remedy the situation. Dean Wig-
more's observation in 1912 is undoubtedly still true:6
The public does not fully understand the position of the judge in
respect to his immunity from exposure by the bar. His professional
iniquities or incompetencies, if any, are so committed as to be di-
54. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
55. Frank, supra note 5. at 49.
56. Id. & n.30. Professor Frank related in a footnote:
I have had pleasant personal relations with most of the Justices. in varying
degrees of closeness, over the past thirty years. As one of them has cheerfully
said, -I can decide a case against you as well as against anyone else.'- and quite
so. However, I have scrupulously sought to avoid any social contact with a
Justice except in the presence of opposing counsel around the time of an argument.
and have felt something of a twinge of embarrassment in accidentally finding myself
at dinner with one of the Justices on the evening before a case was to be presented.
Id. at n.30.
57. Id. at 49. Recently. former Justice Goldberg argued Flood v. Kuhn. 407 U.S.
258 ( 1972), before the Supreme Court (unsuccessfully).
58. See note 43 supra.
59. See, e.g., text accompanying note 33 supra.
60. CoI LIERS. Feb. 10, 1912, at 12.
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rectly known only to a few persons in any given instance; and these
few persons are the attorneys in charge of the case. To bear open testi-
mony against him now is to risk professional ruin at his hands in the
near future. Moreover, this ruin can be perpetrated by him without
fear of the detection of his malice, because a judge's decision can be
openly placed on plausible grounds, while secretly based on the re-
solve to disfavor the attorney in the case. Hence, lawyers dread, most
of all things, to give personal offense to a judge.
Prejudice resulting from prior exposure to the issue being litigated
is seldom mentioned. The prejudice does not necessarily stem from
the fact that the same or a similar issue has been litigated before a
judge previously; rather, the judge's track record begins to indicate a
particular predisposition. This predisposition can become obvious at
the trial or appellate level. For example, in 60 consecutive govern-
ment anti-trust cases, Chief Justice Warren voted in favor of the gov-
ernment 59 times.31 Statistical studies aside, most lawyers stereotype
judges, whether on the state or federal bench, as either "liberal" or
"conservative." Judges are only human, as is often observed, and such
predispositions cannot help but become apparent with the passage of
time. The real question in this area is when a predisposition rises to
the level of prejudice.
In Woods v. Evans,62 a federal district judge for the Western District
of Washington, Judge Goodwin, denied relief in a prisoner class ac-
tion suit seeking judicial prescription of rules for inmate disciplinary
proceedings at the Washington State Penitentiary." 3 Judge Goodwin
stated:64
The complaint and supporting affidavits in this claimed class action
should be referred to a class that is almost forgotten by the complain-
ants and the general public. This Judge is now a member of the
Class. Its name is the National Association of the Victims of Crimes.
The reason that this Judge feels said group should answer the com-
plaints set forth in the affidavits in support of the claims is obvious.
61. Frank, supra note 5, at 48 n.27, citing Stern, Commentary, 38 ANTITRUST
J. 602, 608-09 (1969). During the same period Justices Stewart and Harlan each voted
against the government as frequently as for it. Id.
62. No. 2806 (W.D. Wash., July 5, 1972).
63. See Millemann, Protected Inmate Liberties: A Case for Judicial Responsibility,
53 ORE. L. REv. 29, 37 n.48 (1973).
64. No. 2806, slip opinion at 3.
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The victims have a more personal relationship with the members of
the prison inmate class.
Fortunately for the prison inmate class, their victims have very lit-
tle, if any, voice in the management of the penitentiary and the treat-
ment of its residents. The management of the institution is in the
hands of the politician, and social worker, and, in the case of the
Washington State Penitentiary, the many times convicted felon.
Federal District Judge William H. Cox has been quoted "as having
.repeatedly described 200 [voting] applicants' as 'a bunch of niggers"
and called them 'chimpanzees' who 'ought to be in the movies rather
than being registered to vote.' "'3 Certainly such overt expressions of
cultural or political biases can give rise to the suspicion that a judge
has prejudged a case, especially when his track record or his personal
views are well known in the mind of both litigant and counsel; indeed
they can give rise to an affidavit of prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 144.
Yet it is because "lawyers dread, most of all things, to give personal
offense to a judge"( ; that prejudice stemming from prior exposure to
counsel or the litigant, or to the issue being litigated, or from the
judge's acknowledged cultural background, is seldom mentioned, es-
pecially in federal district courts.
D. Inconsistency in Judicial Petforinance
Inevitably, lawyers also form an opinion of who is or is not a good
judge not only in general but also for a particular type of case. As will
be seen, some federal district judges have human frailties so profound
as to render them, in the opinion of lawyers who practice before them.
unfit for retention on the bench. Yet even these judges are probably
competent to handle many of the routine, uncomplicated matters
which clutter a judge's docket. Conversely, even the best of judges
often are considered to have a "'blind spot," or an area of litigation in
which the judge's rationality and impartiality is perceived as being
somewhat lower than normal. Some lawyers may feel that individual
lawyers, namely themselves, constitute a judge's blind spot. From any
65. Note. Disqualification of Judges Jor Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HR\,. L.
REv. 1434. 1450 n.103 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification for Bias), quoting
TI,,. Nov. 6. 1964. at 44.
66. CoI IERs. Feb. 10, 1912, at 12.
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perspective, and it is primarily the trial lawyer's perspective which is
adopted here, all judges have individual inconsistencies which make
them vulnerable to a charge of being less impartial in one particular
case than in another. Such judges should not be removed from the
bench, or we would have no federal district judges. But certainly the
extent of a particular judge's inconsistency in retaining the appearance
of impartiality ought to be considered in evaluating the propriety of
adopting a without cause affidavit procedure for disqualifying judges
from individual cases.
A unique survey conducted in November 1971, by the Chicago
Council of Lawyers on the judges then sitting in the Federal District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago) found that only 8
of the (then) 13 sitting judges "were favored for continued service by
the responding lawyers."'" 7 Only 4 of the 13 judges were thought
worthy of advancement. A judge was favored for continued service or
advancement (a separate question) if he received a favorable vote of
60 percent of those responding to the survey.
The evaluation of one judge who was not favored for retention on
the bench, Senior Judge Julius Hoffman, who received national at-
tention (and notoriety) while presiding over the Chicago Seven con-
spiracy trial, 8 reflects a perceived lack of consistency in judicial
performance: 69
67. Chicago Council of Lawyers, Results of a Survey of Lawyers Concerning the
Performance of Judicial Officers in the Federal District Court, at 1 (1972) [herein-
after cited as Chicago Survey]. All three of the senior judges sitting in the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois at the time of the survey were
included in the five judges not favored for continued service. Id. at 1-2.
68. See United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972).
69. Chicago Survey at 8. The appellate court summarized Judge Hoffman's
conduct as follows:
The district judge's deprecatory and often antagonistic attitude towards the
defense is evident in the record from the very beginning. It appears in remarks
and actions both in the presence and absence of the jury ....
... It does appear, however, that in comparable situations, the judge was more
likely to exercise his discretion against the defense than against the government.
Most significant, however, were remarks in the presence of the jury, deprecatory
of defense counsel and their case. These comments were often touched with
sarcasm, implying rather than saying outright that defense counsel was inept,
bumptious, or untrustworthy, or that his case lacked merit. Sometimes the com-
ment was not associated with any ruling in ordinary course; sometimes gratui-
tously added to an otherwise proper ruling; nearly always unnecessary. Taken
individually any one was not very significant and might be disregarded as harmless
attempt at humor. But cumulatively, they telegraphed to the jury the judge's
contempt for the defense.
472 F. 2d at 386-87 (footnotes omitted).
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Judge Hoffian received less than 60/( favorable responses on 10
of the 28 questions. These related to his impartiality in both civil and
criminal cases, legal ability in criminal cases, and four aspects of judi-
cial tenperament: patience, courtesy, dignity, and consideration in
scheduling hearings. It is of particular note that on the questions con-
cerning patience and courtesy, all other judges received between 571(
and 98%( favorable responses, while Judge Hoffman received 12(;
and 131 favorable responses, respectively.
Another federal district judge in Chicago, Judge William J. Lynch.
fared even worse when evaluated by the lawyers who practiced in his
court:
7t
1
Judge Lynch received less than 60(i favorable responses on 21 of
the 28 questions. He received unfavorable responses on all seven ques-
tions relating to judicial integrity, all eight relating to legal ability, and
all live relating to diligence. He received at least 60%i favorable re-
sponses on all of the six questions concerning judicial temperament.
That the members of the Illinois bar practicing before the federal
district court in Chicago feel that 38.5 percent (5 of 13) of the federal
district judges should not continue on the bench and 69 percent (9 of
13) of the judges should not be considered for judicial advancement is
startling. Such statistics suggest that the number of judges considered
unfit for retention on the bench nationwide may be higher than
anyone has dared to predict. But members of the Illinois bar and
members of the federal bar throughout the country are forced to con-
tinue to practice before these judges, for at present there is no effec-
tive method, except in extreme circumstances, for a lawyer to avoid
litigating a case before a judge who he personally feels is unfit or prej-
udiced.
II. EXISTING METHODS OF DISQUALIFYING
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES
As has been demonstrated, there are a variety of circumstances in
which it may be appropriate to disqualify federal district judges from
presiding over particular cases. In extreme circumstances, it may be
necessary to remove a federal district judge from the bench perma-
70. Chicago Survey at 8.
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nently. This section will focus primarily on the present disqualification
mechanisms; only brief mention will be made of removal mechanisms.
A. Statutory Disqualification Mechanisms
Two federal statutes govern disqualification of federal district
judges: 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides for disqualification based upon
the filing of a "with cause" affidavit of prejudice by a party litigant
or counsel; 28 U.S.C. § 455 defines the circumstances in which a judge
should affirmatively disqualify himself or herself.
1. Section 144
The present disqualification statute reads:71
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him
or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that
bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before
the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or
good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A
party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompa-
nied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good
faith.
Enacted in 1911 and redrafted slightly in 1948,72 Section 144 was
first interpreted in Berger v. United States,73 which held that the chal-
lenged judge could not determine the truth of the facts contained in
the affidavit of prejudice, but he or she could decide whether the al-
leged facts gave "fair support" to the charge of bias or prejudice.
Stated another way, Section 144 "'made possible the disqualification of
a federal judge upon the showing of facts which indicated the possible
71. 28U.S.C. § 144(1970).
72. See Disqualification for Bias, supra note 65, at 1436. See also Note, Disquali-
fication of a Federal District Judge for Bias-The Standard Under Section 144, 57
MINN. L. REV. 749 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Section 144 Standard].
73. 255 U.S. 22, 33-34 (1921), discussed in Disqualification for Bias, supra note
65, at 1437, & Section 144 Standard, supra note 72, at 755.
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presence of bias, thereby focusing not only upon impartiality itself but
also upon the appearance of impartiality. "'- As interpreted by Berger
and subsequent cases, however, under Section 144 "the affiant must
affirmatively show bias in fact. ''75
Prior to a brief examination of the difficulty of establishing bias in
fact, it is appropriate to observe how the mechanics of Section 144
work to intimidate and embarrass lawyers appearing in federal district
court. To disqualify a federal district judge under Section 144, attor-
neys must timely file in good faith an affidavit alleging facts sufficient
to establish that the particular judge is biased in fact. This affidavit is
then passed upon by the very judge who is being challenged. If the
challenged judge finds the affidavit lacking, he denies the motion for
recusal or disqualification.7" The losing litigant then has a choice of
proceeding to trial before the challenged judge or appealing the denial
of the motion for disqualification to the Court of Appeals. If the mo-
tion loses on appeal, the trial will proceed before the challenged
judge. Recalling Dean Wigmore's observation that "'lawyers dread.
most of all things, to give personal offense to a judge," it is not diffi-
cult to imagine the embarrassment and strain upon a lawyer who is
forced to go to trial before the very judge who has previously passed
upon a motion, made in good faith, which alleged that he or she was
too biased to judge the case fairly. Thus, the existing Section 144 pro-
cedure places the lawyer, the federal district judge and perhaps the
party litigant in a very awkward situation. In the words of Senator
Birch Bayh: 'Surely litigants who believe that they cannot get a fair
trial before a particular judge should not have to convince the very
same judge of his bias." 7
How successful are attorneys who file Section 144 affidavits? No
complete data is available to adequately answer this question. How-
ever, even the most cursory review of the case law under Section 144
indicates that the present Section 144 bias-in-fact standard is very dif-
ficult to satisfy. A recent casenote on the Section 144 standard ob-
served:78
74. Section 144 Standard, supra note 72, at 749.
75. Id. at 750.
76. Frank. supra note 5, at 45, declared that the concept of recusation is obsolete.
See also id. at 45 n.7.
77. 116CONG. REC. 27798 (1970); 117CoNG. REC. 15268 t1971).
78. Section 144 Standard, supra note 72, at 755 56.
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[Berger] did evince the Court's disposition in favor of a liberal stan-
dard for disqualification.
In the years that followed, however, lower federal courts effectively
abandoned the import of Berger by adopting narrow constructions of
Section 21 [the immediate predecessor of Section 144]. The statute's
purposes were frequently circumscribed by restrictive interpretations
of the "personal bias or prejudice" which the affiant must show to gain
recusal and by the imposition of a high burden of proof of such bias.
Both constraints greatly reduced the availability of disqualification as a
remedy for litigants suspecting partiality.
The Note concisely summarizes the Section 144 standard applied by
the various federal courts:7 9
Under the terms of the statute, the affiant must affirmatively demon-
strate a manifestation of a feeling of the trial judge "either against
him or in favor of any adverse party." However, a litigant's affirma-
tive showing of identifiable bias alone is insufficient to gain recusal.
Instead, many federal courts require each litigant seeking recusal to
show that the judge dislikes him as a person. Similarly, other courts
have held that neither bias against the affiant's cause nor identifiable
prejudgment on the merits is sufficient to obtain disqualification....
Other federal courts have looked to the source of a judge's alleged
bias in an attempt to determine whether it is personal to the litigants.
Most of these courts agree that if a bias developed during the course of
previous litigation, no ground for disqualification exists. In United
States v. Grinnell, the Supreme Court further confined the scope of
recusable bias. In order to be disqualifying, the alleged bias "must
stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the
merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his par-
ticipation in the case."
This description of the standard which has developed under Section
144 indicates how difficult it is to disqualify a federal district judge by
affidavit. The standard is not impossible to meet, however. In United
Family Life Insurance Co. v. Barrow,8 0 a federal district judge who
"commenced work on an attempt to keep [a] ranch business in oper-
ation and to readjust pursuant to Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act"
and who was also designated to hear a series of lawsuits relating to
79. Id. at 756-58 (footnotes omitted).
80. 452F.2d997(10thCir. 1971).
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distribution of the proceeds of $ 15 million of life insurance, part of
the proceeds of which were to go towards operation of the ranch, was
held to be "in an inconsistent position" and was disqualified under
Section 144 by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.8
Beyond financial conflicts of interest, advertent or inadvertent, the
Section 144 standard is almost impossible to meet. In Pfizer Inc. v.
Lord,82 an antitrust action against drug manufacturers, the defend-
ants alleged that Federal District Judge Miles W. Lord demonstrated
bias in several ways.,":' In a lengthy opinion, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals applied the Grinnell test--"the alleged bias and prejudice
to be disqualifying must stem from an extrajudicial source and result
in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge
learned from his participation in the case" 4-to the facts in the re-
cord and denied relief. However, the Eighth Circuit court added: z5
We are convinced of petitioners' sincerity and good faith in filing
their affidavits even though we have ruled adversely to their conten-
tions. ('learly some of Judge Lord's remarks have unnecessarily
shaken petitioners' confidence in his impartiality ...
81. Id. at 999.
82. 456 F.2d 532 (8th C ir.). cert. denied, 406 U.S. 976(1972).
83. Defendants alleged eight grounds for the judge's bias:
(1) taking aggressive action to attempt to dissuade the United States Department
of Justice from settling its civil action against the defendants in an effort to assist
the other plaintiffs:
(2) suggesting that the United States Government, if it were to settle its civil
action, would be permitting the defendants to "buy a monopoly":
(3) declaring that: "We may have another proceeding, or, at least some
moves" against defendants to vindicate the integrity of the United States Patent
Office and courts for fraud on those tribunals":
(4) urging the Department of Justice to investigate the Patent Office. which
he characterized as "the sickest institution that our Government has ever invented"
and "the weakest link in the competitive system in America":
(5) refusing, without a hearing, to consider a settlement of the treble damage
class actions at a dollar amount previously approved in these cases by another
district court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. which caused
one damage plaintiff to withdraw its agreement to settle for that dollar amount:
(6) soliciting law suits against defendants by urging a private attorney to find
some hospital patients to form a new class of plaintiffs:
(7) interrogating a deposition witness in an aggressive and angry manner, in
an attempt to intimidate the witness and to influence his testimony along the
lines desired by plaintiffs, suggesting openly that the witness was evasive and
lying, and threatening to levy a fine: and
(8) accusing counsel for one of the petitioners of instructing his client to
"manufacture" and "doctor" evidence.
Id. at 535-36.
84. Id. at 537, quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp.. 384 U.S. 563. 583 (1966).
85. Id. at 544.
128
Disqualifying Federal District Judges
•.. This record reflects adversely upon Judge Lord's conduct during
the pretrail proceedings. Reluctantly, we have pointed out his short-
comings in this case ...
These cases will continue under Judge Lord's aegis. We expect him
to provide an impartial forum in compliance with his judicial obliga-
tion . ..
Any further review of the case law under 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970)
seems unnecessary. It is sufficient to note that the Section 144 stan-
dard is clearly established, it is very difficult to meet and it places all
concerned in an extremely embarrassing situation. As Senator Bayh
has stated: "No statute creates more distrust than does the section 144
procedure for disqualification for prejudice." 86 Yet no discernable
judicial trend towards changing the standard is apparent.
2. Section 455
Section 455 explicitly directs a judge to disqualify him or herself
from an individual case in certain broadly defined circumstances:8 7
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, is
or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with
any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.
As discussed at length earlier, many political observers believe that it
was Judge Clement J. Haynsworth, Jr.'s failure to disqualify himself
from a number of cases which led the Senate to reject his nomination
to the Supreme Court. The Haynsworth episode changed the Section
455 disqualification standard from "substantial interest" in a pro-
ceeding to "any interest" in a proceeding, in order to avoid even the
appearance of impropriety.88
Aside from the Haynsworth nomination, however, Section 455 is
seldom used and seldom litigated. Litigants not intimately familiar
with a judge's financial portfolio lack the information necessary to
challenge a judge's refusal to disqualify himself; judicial abuse of
86. 116 CONG. REC. 27798 (1970); 117 CONG. REc. 15268 (1971).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-512, discussed in Part
II-C iifra.
88. See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
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Section 455 seldom can be discovered. Moreover the Section 455
burden of proof is a heavy one. Holdings that a federal district judge
need not disqualify himself when hearing cases filed while he was the
area United States Attorney are common,"!' even though they seem to
stretch the language of Section 455. In Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Rit-
ter,"1' when a federal district judge challenged an order of the Judi-
cial Council of the Tenth Circuit, most members of the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court refused to disqualify themselves under Section 455 even
though they were members of the Judicial Council at the time the
challenged order was entered.
The publicity surrounding the Haynsworth nomination focused at-
tention on the section and led to proposals for change. Action by the
Senate in 1973 makes revision of Section 455 seem likely; the pro-
posed change will be discussed below.
B. ABA Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 3C
Canon 3C of the new Code of Judicial Conduct " begins: "A
judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned . . ." and goes on to list specific
situations when a judge should disqualify himself. Justice Rehnquist in
his memorandum explaining his refusal to withdraw in Laird v.
Tatum equated the ABA CODE'S Canon 3C and the standard under
Section 4 55,92 but his analysis has been strongly criticized.
The differences between the two standards have been capsulized
as follows:
89. See Gravenmier v. United States, 469 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1972) (Federal dis-
trict judge who was listed as "of counsel" while United States attorney during a
prior, separate proceeding against defendant not required to disqualify himself under
Section 455); United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1972) (Same judge.
same holding, except no separate proceeding involved); United States v. Wilson,
426 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1970) (Federal district judge need not disqualify himself in a
criminal proceeding filed when he was United States attorney for the locality in
charge of the investigation where he knew nothing of case and where he had in-
formed defendant of this fact and had volunteered to withdraw and defendant had
waived withdrawal).
90. 461 F.2d l100(10thCir. 1972).
91. The CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, supra note 41, was approved by the ABA
House of Delegates in August. 1972. See generally Disqualification of Judges, supra
note 45, at 742-50. The CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT was made applicable to all
federal judges by the Judicial Conference of the United States in April 1973. . REP.
No. 93-419, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 ( 1973).
92. 409 U.S. 824, 825 (1972). See notes 53 & 54 and accompanying test supra.
93. See, e.g., Disqualification of Judges, supra note 45. at 744-45.
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First, the Code states as a general rule that a judge must disqualify
himself whenever "his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
Thus, in contrast to the situation under section 455, an underlying
standard is articulated to guide the judge when the circumstances do
not fall clearly within one of the Code's specific grounds for disqualifi-
cation. Second, the Code sets forth an extensive but nonexclusive list
of per se rules for disqualification which go far beyond the tests of sec-
tion 455 in both scope and precision.
The Code of Judicial Conduct has been the subject of praise
because its goal is the appearance of impartiality throughout the judi-
ciary. "[D] isqualification should follow if the 'reasonable man,' were
he to know 'all the circumstances,' would harbor doubts about the
judge's impartiality. 14 Yet whatever its differences from Section 455,
and no matter how laudible its goals, unless judges rigorously adhere
to the Canon 3C standard, party litigants must still rely on Section
455 to attempt to force judges to disqualify themselves. Canon 3C
provides law review writers with good ammunition for scholarly at-
tacks on Supreme Court Justices and may provide a useful standard
for review of the conduct of federal judicial nominees, but it will do
little to help individual practitioners who harbor a feeling that a fed-
eral district judge will not provide a fair and impartial forum in a par-
ticular case.
C. Senate Bill 1064: Revision of Section 455 to Include the Canon
3C Standard
On October 4, 1973, the Senate passed Senate Bill 106495 which
incorporates Canon 3C of the Code of Judicial Conduct into 28 U.S.C.
§ 455; that bill became effective as Public Law 93-512 on December
5, 1974.
Under S. 1064, the Code's general rule that a judge must disqualify
himself or herself whenever "his [or her] impartiality might reason-
ably be questioned" is drafted literally into subsection (a) of Section
455. Subsection (b) lists specific circumstances in which a judge must
disqualify. These circumstances are almost identical to those outlined
in Canon 3C.
94. Id. at 745, citing E. THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
60(1973).
95. S. 1064, 93d Congress, Ist Sess. (1973).
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This increased specificity concerning when a judge must disqualify
is commendable. Subsection (d)(4) of the revamped Section 455 de-
fines "'financial interest" as "ownership of a legal interest or equitable
interest, however small...," thereby codifying what is now believed
to be the standard which Court of Appeals judges have applied since
the Haynsworth nomination." ; Subsection (e) prohibits waiver of dis-
qualification in any of the circumstances outlined in subsection (b).
but not in the more general subsection (a) area if there has been full
disclosure.
Certainly S. 1064 is a step in the right direction. But it is a modest
step. Attorneys still function under the handicap of having little or
no information about a judge's personal or financial background
or holdings. The Act requires judges to disqualify themselves in spe-
cific, narrow circumstances. Congressional adoption of the "any pro-
ceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned" is
interpreted in the accompanying Report as meaning: "Disqualifica-
tion for lack of impartiality must have a reasonable basis.."9 7 It will
be for the courts to decide what a "reasonable basis" is and, judg-
ing from the judiciary's record on both Sections 144 and 455, a nar-
row interpretation can be expected. Finally, challenges to a judge
brought under a revised Section 455 must still be reviewed by fellow
judges, thereby ignoring "the possibility of embarrassment and ten-
sion created when one man must rule on the impartiality of his col-
league-and often, his friend." ' 8
D. Removal Procedures
1. Impeachment
Little need be said about removal procedures, which result in the
complete removal of a federal judge from the bench. Virtually every-
one who has ever written on the subject of impeachment has con-
cluded that it is a cumbersome, ineffective, and therefore seldom used
method of removing judges.:19 Thomas Jefferson believed that im-
96. See text accompanying notes 39-43 supra.
97. S. REP. No. 93 419. 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 5(1973).
98. 116 CoNc,. REC. 27798 (1970).
99. See generally J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE 189 204 (1962): Comment,
The Limitations of Article I11 on the Proposed Judicial Removal Machinery: S. 1506,
118 U. PA. L. REv. 1064 & n.5 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment. S. 1506].
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peachment was not an efficient threat to a usurping and lawless
judge. 100 The inefficiency of impeachment led Raoul Berger to con-
clude that impeachment is not the only constitutionally permissible
method of removing federal district judges.' 01
2. Removal by judicial conference
Late in 1965, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that Federal District Judge Stephen S. Chandler was
"presently unable, or unwilling, to discharge efficiently the duties of
his office" and ordered him to "take no action whatsoever in any case
or proceeding now or hereafter pending .... ,,102 This action, which is
referred to collectively as the Chandler incident, led to a legal battle
between Judge Chandler and the Judicial Council of the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in which the United States Supreme Court refused to intervene
(twice), over whether the Judicial Council could constitutionally take
such action or whether impeachment was the only method by which a
federal judge could be removed. Within two months, Judge Chandler
and the Judicial Council settled their differences; the Council allowed
Judge Chandler to retain about 160 cases which had already been as-
signed to him; in turn, he was not to be assigned any new cases' and
he agreed not to contest the Council's modified order.' 03 However,
Judge Chandler later unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandamus or
alternatively a writ of prohibition to the Judicial Council in the Su-
preme Court. The Court denied the relief requested on procedural
rather than substantive grounds.104 Hence, the constitutionality of the
Judicial Council's action is still open to question.
Senate Bill 1506 (the Judicial Reform Act)10 5 is an attempt by
Congress to establish a nonimpeachment removal mechanism for re-
100. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane, Sept. 6, 1819, in LAWLESS
JUDGES, supra note 6, at 246 n.12.
101. R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS Ch. 4 (1973).
Berger argues for the adoption of a statute defining specific conduct which violates the
good behavior proviso. Errant judges could then be tried in the judicial system for
violation of the statute, and if convicted, removed from office. See Bestor, Book
Review, 49 WASH. L. REV. 255, 257 (1973).
102. Misc. Order No. 1111, 382 U.S. 1003, 1004 (1966), quoted in Note, The
Chandler Incident and the Problems of Judicial Removal, 19 STAN. L. REV. 448
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Chandler Incident].
103. Chandler Incident at 450.
104. Chandler v. Judicial Council of Tenth Circuit, 398 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
105. S. 1506, 91st Cong., lstSess.(1969).
133
Washington Law Review
calcitrant or incompetent federal judges. 0 6 Under S. 1506, the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States would preside over removal of
the judges if the "good Behaviour" standard of the Constitution' 07 has
not been met.108 Additionally, the bill provides for involuntary retire-
ment of judges whose physical or mental disabilities prevent them
from carrying out their judicial duties. 09 Here again, however, it can
be anticipated that a removal procedure as proposed in S. 1506 would
be used only in extreme cases, and not when particular litigants are
concerned about the impartiality of a particular federal district judge
in a given case.
E. Summary
The Section 144 standard for disqualification of judges in indi-
vidual cases is very difficult to satisfy. The nature of the affidavit
procedure-the challenged judge reviews the adequacy of the
challenge-places the lawyer or litigant in a very awkward position,
especially when the affidavit is found inadequate. The self-disqual-
ification standard of Section 455 as judicially interpreted is equally
difficult to satisfy, although the Haynsworth nomination may have
changed the actual practice of sitting judges. Canon 3C of the Code
of Judicial Conduct establishes a more specific list of instances which
require self-disqualification; Public Law 93-512 incorporates this
standard into Section 455. By its nature, however, even if included
in Section 455, the Canon 3C standard probably will do little to as-
suage the fears of an attorney who is skeptical for inarticulable rea-
sons about a judge's impartiality in a particular case. Finally, the
standards for permanent removal of federal district judges are even
more difficult to meet.
To preserve or create a system which approaches the avowed
goal of maintaining an appearance of fairness as well as meting out
fairness itself, new disqualification procedures seem necessary. It is sug-
gested that adoption of new disqualification procedures will obviate
the need for adoption of new removal procedures. Removal of a judge
106. See Comment, S. 1506, supra note 99, at 1064-65.
107. U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1.
108. S. 1506, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 378(1969).
109. Id. § 380.
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is a drastic step. Most judges are capable of handling some of the
routine cases found on the typical federal district court docket. So
long as attorneys can avoid going to trial before judges who either are
unfit or are perceived to be unfit to preside over a particular case,
there seems to be no pressing need to totally remove the judge in ques-
tion from the federal bench.
III. DISQUALIFICATION WITHOUT CAUSE:
A PROPOSAL FOR REVISION OF SECTION 144
A. The Bayh Bill
On August 7, 1970, and again on May 17, 1971, Senator Birch
Bayh introduced Senate Bill 4201110 and Senate Bill 1886111 which
were popularly titled the Judicial Disqualification Acts. 112 The two
bills were identical: each proposed revision of 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and
455. No Congressional action was taken on either bill. Emphasis
here will be placed upon Senator Bayh's proposal for revision of Sec-
tion 144.113
Section 144 of each Judicial Disqualification Act proposed to
amend 28 U.S.C. § 144 as follows:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court, either with
his own verification or over his attorney's signature, makes and files a
timely affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any ad-
verse party, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another
judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. The affidavit shall be
timely if filed (a) twenty or more days before the time first set for trial
or (b) within ten days after the filing party is first given notice of the
identity of the trial judge or (c) when good cause is shown for failure
to file the affidavit within such times. A party may file only one such
affidavit in any case, and only one affidavit may be filed on a side. A
party waives his right to file an affidavit by participating in a hearing
or submission of any motion or other matter requiring the judge to
exercise discretion as to any aspect of the case or by beginning trial
proceedings before the judge.
110. S. 4201, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
111. S. 1886, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
112. 116 CONG. REc. 27796-27797 (1970); 117 CONG. REc. 15267-15269 (1971).
113. Proposed revision of Section 455 is discussed in Part II, Section C, supra.
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This amendment would have effectively adopted a "without cause"
affidavit procedure similar to that in existence in approximatley 17
states, " 14 including Washington, Oregon, and California." 15
Upon introduction of the Judicial Disqualification Acts, Senator
Bayh explained how the proposed amendments to Section 144 would
remedy its present deficiencies:" 6
The Judicial Disqualification Act ... would create a right in a liti-
gant to one peremptory challenge of a trial judge assigned to hear his
case, adopting a disqualification provision now employed in California
and a number of other States. Under such a provision a judge is dis-
qualified upon the filing of an affidavit alleging bias or prejudice and
signed by the party or by his lawyer. The disqualified judge is left with
no option except to determine whether the application has been timely
made. The affidavit must be filed before any discretionary matter has
been presented to the judge. Each side is restricted to one challenge, in
order to avoid abuse in cases where one of the parties simply wants to
create delays or to avoid trial altogether.
The Bayh bill drew immediate praise from Professor John P.
Frank, who predicted that resistance to the Bayh proposal "will be
personal and emotional; the judge does not like to be judged."" 7 This
observation may account for the failure of Congress to take any ac-
tion on Section 144 of the Bayh bill; it has not even been introduced
in the 93rd Congress.
B. Would It Work? The Oregon Experience
There exists a concern that an automatic disqualification mecha-
nism would be abused by attorneys appearing in federal district court,
making more work for the limited judicial personnel and creating
administrative chaos. 1 8 The Report accompanying S. 1064 con-
114. See generally Oregon Project, supra note 4.
115. CALIF. CIv. PRO. CODE § 170.6 (West Supp. 1972): ORE. REV. STAT. §§
14.250-.270 (1963): WASH. REV. CODE § 4.12.050(1963).
116. 117CoNG. REc. 15268(1971).
117. Frank, supra note 5, at 67.
118. Professor Frank also stated: "'Those from 'hard' disqualification states are
shocked to suppose that one can strike a judge as he would a juror. Those from
.soft' disqualification states take it as a matter of course." Id. As Professor Frank
practices in a -soft" disqualification state (Arizona). critics might allege that he. too.
views without cause affidavits **as a matter of course" rather than objectively evaluat-
ing the procedure.
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cluded that there are enough judicial personnel to cope with more
stringent self-disqualification standards, 119 but doubts surrounding
attorney abuse of an automatic disqualification mechanism can be
dispersed only by empirical data. The logical place to seek such data
is in a state which has adopted a without cause disqualification proce-
dure.
Fortunately, an extraordinarily thorough study of an automatic
disqualification state, Oregon, has been performed. 120 The empirical
study (referred to as the Oregon Project), conducted by the staff
of the Oregon Law Review, covers cases filed between May 1, 1955,
and January 1, 1968, and affidavits filed between May 2, 1955 and
July 1, 1968.121 The study covered 259,200 cases filed in this 13-
year period in the circuit courts (trial courts of original and gen-
eral jurisdiction) of Oregon. 122 The field data was analyzed at the
University of Oregon Computer Center.
In all aspects save one, the Oregon affidavit procedure is identical
to the scheme proposed in the Bayh bill and the one in effect in 16
other states. Oregon's procedure differs from the Bayh proposal in that
each side is allowed two affidavits without cause.123 This difference,
however, makes the Oregon procedure even more subject to abuse
than a system which allows for only one affidavit.124 Both schemes
require only that the affidavit be timely and filed in good faith. 125
119. In discussing the practical impact of a revision of Section 455's disqualifica-
tion procedure, the Report accompanying S. 1064 acknowledged the growth in the
size of the federal judiciary:
There are approximately 667 federal judges, active and retired. The statutes
contain ample authority for chief judges to assign other judges to replace either
a circuit or a district judge who becomes disqualified.
S. REP. No. 93-419, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
120. Oregon Project, supra note 4.
121. Id. at 378.
122. Id. at 379.
123. Id. at 374.
124. A built-in safeguard against abuse of without cause affidavit procedures is
the possibility that a litigant, after exercising the "free" affidavit, may be forced to
go to trial before a judge who has previously been the recipient of a similar affidavit.
By doubling the number of "free" affidavits, Oregon's procedure halves the possibility.
Hence an attorney who practices in a rural county with only one or two circuit courtjudges can affidavit one or both with impunity, which could lead to abuse of the affi-
davit procedure.
125. Oregon Project, supra note 4, at 360. "Timely" generally means the affidavit
must be filed before the judge in question has made any decision involving the exer-
cise of discretion. Id. at 366-71. Most litigation focuses on the timing of the filing of
the affidavit. Id. at 375. "Good faith" means what it says and is rarely litigated.
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The authors of the Oregon Project undertook an evaluation of the
field data explicitly to determine whether the Oregon statutes had
been the subject of abuse. They concluded: 126
[T]he liberal Oregon affidavit of prejudice statutes are being used
with restraint, and ... are responsible for a minimum of disruption to
court administration. Most persons who invoke the statute with any
degree of frequency have apparent bona fide reasons for doing so.
A more detailed description of the Oregon Project's findings follows.
Out of 259,200 cases analyzed, the authors found that approxi-
mately one disqualification affidavit was entered for each 186 cases
filed,' 27 of which 92.2 percent were successful.' 2 8 Judges were dis-
qualified for statutory prejudice in one out of 202 cases, not an
alarming frequency.
Surprisingly, a very few law firms accounted for a disproportion-
ately large number of affidavits. Six firms were responsible for 49.6
percent of the affidavits filed, and one of those six firms (Firm A) ac-
counted for 31.1 percent of the total affidavits filed.' 29 Firm A di-
rected 426 or 98.8% of all its challenges at one particular judge. This
appeared to be a personal dispute between Firm A and the judge, for
the same judge was the subject of only 23 challenges by attorneys
other than members of Firm A.' 30
Firm A made 98.3 percent of its challenges on its own behalf and
only 1.7 percent on behalf of its clients.' 3' The authors noted that
when a "hostile relationship" developed between a law firm and a
judge, the firm usually thought it necessary to continue to affidavit the
judge ad infinitem on its own behalf, and not on its clients behalf. 32
Overall, attorneys filed 62.1 percent of the challenges and clients
signed the remaining 37.9 percent of the affidavits of prejudice.' 33
Excluding members of Firm A from the data, 13 attorneys made 50.3
percent of all challenges to Oregon circuit judges.' 34 Thus, less than
126. Id. at 399.
127. Id. at 379.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 380.
130. Id. at 388.
131. Id. at 380.
132. Id. at 381-82.
133. Id. at 385, Table 3.
134. Id. at 383.
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one-half of 1 percent of all the attorneys active during the 13-year
period of the study made one-half of the challenges. 135
Eighty-nine different circuit judges held office during the 13-year
period studied. Seventy-three of these judges were challenged at least
once; 37 were challenged at least five or more times; and 11 judges
were challenged 30 or more times. 136 Of the 16 judges receiving no
challenges, only two held office more than 9 years; all of the re-
maining 14 judges served 5 years or less.' 37 Visiting or pro tem judges
were challenged by affidavit 2.4 times as often as regular sitting
judges.'38 Beyond this "visiting judge" category, judges with 11 to 15
years on the bench were most frequently subjected to affidavit. 139
The authors found no trend to affidavit judges more or less often in
urban or in rural counties. 140 Little evidence was found to support the
conclusion that affidavits were used to "judge shop" in two-judge
counties: indeed, the rate of challenges was only two-thirds that of the
normal rate for all counties.' 4 ' Finally, the authors studied which
party to a lawsuit was more prone to affidavit a judge. The data re-
vealed that plaintiffs (or their attorneys) filed 39 percent of the chal-
lenges; defendants filed 61 percent. 42 The high rate of challenges in
criminal cases probably accounts for this difference. 43
The Oregon Project's conclusions, based upon an extraordinarily
thorough empirical study, seem to fully support Professor John P.
Frank; the automatic disqualification system does work "without
strain or humiliation where it exists."' 44
C. Suggested Improvements to the Bayh Bill
Two improvements on the automatic disqualification system pro-
posed in the Bayh bill will be briefly considered. The first involves the
135. Id. at n.442.
136. Id. at 385.
137. Id.at385-86.
138. Id. at 388.
139. Id. at 389, Table 5.
140. "It is fair to say that the challenges were well distributed throughout the 36
counties, if relative caseload adjustments are made." Id. at 391.
141. Id.at393.
142. Id. at 385, Table 3.
143. See id.
144. Frank, supra note 5, at 67.
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number of affidavits allowed each side; the second concerns the form
of the affidavit.
The Oregon statutes which were the subject of the Oregon Project
study allow each litigant two automatic affidavits of prejudice, while
the Bayh proposal allows each side only a single peremptory challenge
of a judge. Professor Frank explained the more restrictive nature of
the Bayh proposal as follows: "the goal is substantial justice within the
limits of available judicial personnel and one challenge per side is as
many strikes as the structure can carry."1 45 However, it is not clear
that there is an insufficient number of federal district judges to merit
two or more disqualifications per side. Oregon, a small state with
"limited judicial personnel," has encountered no difficulty with its dis-
qualification system. In large metropolitan areas, one affidavit may be
insufficient to eliminate the potential judges a lawyer or litigant ac-
tually believes are biased. When polled, the federal bar in Chicago
indicated a desire to retain only 8 of its (then) 13 federal district
judges. The possibility of being forced to go to trial before an unde-
sirable judge because the lawyer has exercised his sole "free" affidavit
in the instant case can loom large in a trial attorney's mind. Such a
prospect may deter use of the affidavit in instances which would other-
wise warrant its use.
Granting more than one affidavit without cause should reduce this
possibility and encourage honest use of the affidavit procedure. If the
Oregon experience holds true nationwide, no abuse would result. Fi-
nally, if limited judicial personnel is the only valid objection to use of
a multi-affidavit procedure, a sliding scale system could be adopted
whereby the number of affidavits allowed depends upon the number
of federal district judges in a particular district. Hence, a district with
fewer than 4 judges could allow only one challenge per side; a district
with at least 4 but fewer than 8 judges could allow two challenges per
side; a district with at least 8 but fewer than 12 judges could allow
three per side; and a district with 12 or more judges could allow four
or more challenges per side.
The form of the affidavit is rarely considered in detail. Usually stat-
utes require attorneys or their clients to state in good faith that they
believe a judge to be biased or prejudiced against them. It has been
145. Id. at 66.
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said that this type of affidavit makes liars of attorneys. 146 The affidavit
could state simply: "I would prefer that a judge other than
Judge hear this case."' 47 This suggestion would seem to
avoid unduly antagonizing judges and might place attorneys in a less
compromising position.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Comment has explored at length the need for improved dis-
qualification and removal mechanisms in the federal district courts.
From the trial attorney's perspective, the need for an adequate dis-
qualification procedure-one which avoids having the very judge
being challenged pass on the merits of the challenge, or similarly, one
which avoids having a colleague of the challenged judge pass upon the
merits 4 8 -is clear. Based upon the Oregon experience, warnings of
possible abuse of a peremptory challenge system and of exhaustion of
limited judicial personnel appear unfounded.
From the perspective of a federal district judge, adoption of a
without cause disqualification procedure may be beneficial. It may be
true that "the judge does not like to be judged," but some feedback
from the local bar may be welcome. A judge who receives an abnor-
mally high number of affidavits of prejudice, though not subject to
formal pressure, would usually be led to reevaluate his demeanor or
performance. Some judges may conclude, quite correctly, that they
should go on senior status or retire altogether. A without cause dis-
qualification mechanism may prove to be an efficient, humane way of
indicating to elderly judges that the time for retirement has arrived.
What would the legal profession or the public think of a without
cause disqualification procedure at the federal district court level?
Liberals would cheer the adoption of a procedure which could dis-
146. Interview with C. Z. Smith, Associate Dean of the University of Washington
School of Law, in Seattle, early March 1974. Dean Smith was a trial judge in Seattle
for 8 years, 1 year as a municipal court judge (traffic and misdemeanor cases only) and
7 years as a superior court judge (general and original jurisdiction).
147. Id.
148. One possible change in section 144 would require some other judge to
rule on the question of a trial judge's alleged bias. However, this still puts undue
pressure on counsel, and it ignores the possibility of embarrassment and tension
created when one man must rule on the impartiality of his colleague-and often,
his friend.
116 CONG. REC. 27798 (1970); 117 CONG. REc. 15268 (1971).
141
Washington Law Review
qualify a judge with a rather blatant predisposition against liberal ac-
tions, such as prisoner class actions. Conservatives would cheer a pro-
cedure which allowed for the disqualification of a liberal judge from
deep South civil rights cases. And each might oppose adoption of a
without cause challenge system for the very same reason-from their
perspective it would permit disqualification of a judge whose orienta-
tion or bent they share. Yet these considerations should not play an
important part in a discussion over the merits of an automatic disqual-
ification system. Truly good judges-judges who dispense justice as
merited in each individual case-will seldom be disqualified. As dem-
onstrated by the Oregon Project, most federal district judges have
nothing to fear from the adoption of a without cause disqualification
procedure in the federal district courts.
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